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Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University
and
Jill Zykowski
CWRU Law School, Class of 2001
This article summarizes many of the criminal law decisions decided by the United States Supreme Court during
the last term.

SEARCH & SEIZURE
Search Incident to Traffic Citation
In Knowles v. Iowa, 119 S.Ct. 484 (1 998), a policeman
stopped Knowles for speeding and issued a citation rather
than arresting him. The officer then conducted a full search
of the car without either Knowles' consent or probable
cause, finding marijuana and a "pot pipe." Because he had
not been arrested, Knowles argued that the search could
not be sustained under the "search incident to arrest" exception. The issue was whether a full search of an automobile pursuant to issuance of a citation for speeding, as authorized by an Iowa statute, violated the Fourth
Amendment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
search was unconstitutional. In the Court's view, there are
"two historical rationales for the 'search incident to arrest'
exception: (1) the need to disarm the suspect in order to
take him into custody, and (2) the need to preserve evidence for later use at trial. .. . But neither of these underlying rationales for the search incident to arrest exception is
sufficient to justify the search in the present case." The
Court remarked that the ''threat to officer safety from issuing
a traffic citation . . . is a good deal less than in the case of a
custodial arrest," which involves extended exposure in taking a suspect into custody and transporting him to the police
station. In contrast, a routine traffic stop is a relatively brief
encounter and is more analogous to a Terry stop than to a
formal arrest. The second justification - the need to discover and preserve evidence- also did not apply. Once
Knowles was issued a citation, all the evidence necessary
to prosecute that offense had been obtained. No further evidence of excessive speed was going to be found either on
the person of the offender or in the passenger compartment
of the car.
The Court also stressed that the officer is not without

means to protect his or her safety:
[O]fficers have other, independent bases to search for
weapons and protect themselves from danger. For example, they may order out of a vehicle both the driver,
and any passengers; perform a "patdown" of a driver
and any passengers upon reasonable suspicion that
they may be armed and dangerous; conduct a "Terry
patdown" of the passenger compartment of a vehicle
upon reasonable suspicion that an occupant is dangerous and may gain immediate control of a weapon;
and even conduct a full search of the passenger compartment, including any containers therein, pursuant
to a custodial arrest (citations omitted).

Automobile Exception
In Maryland v. Dyson, 19 S.Ct. 2013 (1 999), the defendant was convicted of conspiracy to possess cocaine with
intent to distribute. A deputy received a tip from a reliable
source that the defendant had bought drugs and would be
returning to Maryland in a red Toyota, license number DDY.
When the police spotted the car with the defendant, a
known drug dealer, they stopped him and searched the car.
They did not have a warrant. Twenty-three grams of cocaine were found.
On review, the Supreme Court was asked to determine
whether the Fourth Amendment's "automobile exception"
has a separate exigency requirement in cases in which
there is sufficient time to acquire a search warrant. In a per
curiam opinion, the Court answered in the negative:
The Fourth Amendment generally requires police to
secure a warrant before conducting a search. As we
recognized nearly 75 years ago in Carroll v. United
States, ... there is an exception to this requirement for
searches of vehicles. And und,er our established
precedent, the "automobile exception" has no separate exigency requirement. We made this clear in
United States v. Ross, ... when we said that in cases
where there was probable cause to search a vehicle
"a search is not unreasonable if based on facts that
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means to transport cocaine. Months later the police arrested him on unrelated charges. The arresting officers, without
a warrant, seized his automobile in accordance with the provisions of the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act. Cocaine
was found in the car, and White was charged with possession of a controlled substance.
White raised the following issue: Whether the Fourth
Amendment requires the police to obtain a warrant before
seizing an automobile from a public place when they have
probable cause to believe that it is forfeitable contraband?
The Court said, "No." With probable cause, the police do not
need a warrant to seize a car on public property.
"Recognition of the need to seize readily movable contraband before it is spirited away undoubtedly underlies the
early federal laws relied upon in Carroll. . .. This need is
equally weighty when the automobile, as opposed to its
contents, is the contraband that the police seek to secure."
The Court went on to note: "Here, because the police
seized respondent's vehicle from a public area - respondent's employer's parking lot- the warrantless seizure also
did not involve any invasion of respondent's privacy. Based
on the relevant history and our prior precedent, we therefore
conclude that the Fourth Amendment did not require a warrant to seize respondent's automobile in these circumstances."
The dissent argued that since there is nothing illegal
about owning a car, a warrant should be needed to search
the car. A warrantless search may intrude on the rights of
innocent people, and there is no safety risk or fear of loss
evidence if the police wait to obtain a properly issued warrant in this context..

would justify the issuance of a warrant, even though a
warrant has not been actually obtained." (Emphasis
added.) In a case with virtually identical facts to this
one (even down to the bag of cocaine in the trunk of
the car), Pennsylvania v. Labron, ... (per curiam), we
repeated that the automobile exception does not have
a separate exigency requirement: "If a car is readily
mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains
contraband, the Fourth Amendment ... permits police
to search the vehicle without more" (citations omitted).
Automobile Exception: Search of Purse
In Wyoming v. Houghton, 119 S.Ct. 1297 (1999), a
Highway Patrol officer stopped a vehicle for a routine traffic
stop, at which point the officer noticed a hypodermic syringe
in the driver's shirt pocket. When the officer asked the driver why he had the syringe, the driver replied ("with refreshing candor'') that he used it for drugs. The officer then
searched the car and its contents, including a passenger's
purse. When the officer found drugs and drug paraphernalia, he arrested the passenger, Houghton.
The Supreme Court upheld the search, ruling that a police officer with probable cause may search the inside of the
car and any containers in the car that are capable of concealing the object of the search. Furthermore, "a package
may be searched, whether or not its owner is present as a
passenger or otherwise." The Court set forth a two step
process to determine if there is a Fourth Amendment violation. The first step is determining ''whether the action was
regarded as an unlawful search or seizure under the common law when the Amendment was framed." If that inquiry
provides no answer, the Court must "evaluate the search or
seizure under traditional standards of reasonableness."
Historically, the permissible scope of a warrantless car
search "is defined by the object of the search and the
places in which there is probable cause to believe that it
may be found." The Court concluded:
In sum, neither Ross [456 U.S. 798 (1 982)] itself nor
the historical evidence it relied upon admits of a distinction among packages or containers based on ownership. When there is probable cause to search for
contraband in a car, it is reasonable for police officers
- like customs officials in the Founding era- to examine packages and containers without a showing of
individualized probable cause for each one. A passenger's personal belongings, just like the driver's belongings or containers attached to the car like a glove compartment, are "in" the car, and the officE:lr has probable
cause to search for contraband in the car.
Moreover, drivers may secret drugs in a passenger's purse
or other container to avoid detection.
Justice Breyer, concurring, agreed that an officer with
probable cause may search a car and its contents, but not
the people in the car A purse that is attached to a person
may possibly be protected. In this case, the purse was separated from the owner; therefore, he agreed with the majority that it may be searched. Justice Stevens, with whom
Justice Souter and Justice Ginsburg joined, dissented: The
search of a person's purse or briefcase is a serious intrusion on privacy and should require specific, individual probable cause.

Standing
In Minnesota v. Carter, 119 S.Ct. 469 (1 998), a police officer looked in an apartment window through a gap in a
closed blind and observed Carter and Johns bagging cocaine. The defendants were not overnight guest; they were
there only for their illegal business activity. The issue before
the Court was whether they had an expectation of privacy
protected by the Fourth Amendment. Without such an expectation, they did not have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the search. The Court found that the "defendants, who were in another person's apartment for a short
time ... [not overnight guests] ... had no legitimate expectations of privacy in the apartment, and, thus, any search
which may have occurred did not violate their Fourth
Amendment rights."
The Court had previously held in Minnesota v. Olson, 495
U.S. 91 (1990), that an overnight guest in a house had
standing. Citing Olson and other cases, the Court concluded: "Thus an overnight guest in a home may claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment, but one who is merely
present with the consent of the householder may not." The
Court cited a number of factors as supporting its conclusions: (1) the purely commercial nature of the transaction
engaged in, (2) the relatively short period of time on the
premises, and (3) the lack of any previous connection between the defendants and the householder.
The Court declined to address another issue, leaving it
for another day: "Because we conclude that respondents
had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the apartment,
we need not decide whether the police officer's observation
constituted a 'search.'"
Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Thomas joined, concurred: "Respondents here were not searched in "their ...

Warrantless Seizure of Forfeitable Property
In Florida v. White, 119 S.Ct. 1555 (1999), police officers
on three occasions observed White using his car as a
2
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house" under any interpretation of the phrase that bears the
remQtest relationship to the well understood meaning of the
Fourth Amendment." Therefore, they are not protected by
the Fourth Amendment.
Justice Ginsberg, with whom Justice Stevens and Justice
Souter joined, dissented: Whether or not a guest is staying
the night is irrelevant to expectations of privacy. Nor does
"the fact that they were partners in crime ... alter the analysis." A private residence is a place where one should be
able to reasonably expect "privacy free of governmental intrusion."

executing a search warrant on petitioners ranch, the police
brought along a media crew from CNN. Again, the Court
found a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Seizure of Property
In City of West Covina v. Perkins, 11 9 S.Ct. 678 (1 999),
local police officers seized property in a home pursuant to a
valid search warrant. The property belonged to Perkins, the
home owner, and his family. However, the search warrant
was issued because Marcus Marsh, a former boarder in the
Perkins' home, was a suspect. The officers left a "Search
Warrant: Notice of Service" and an itemized list of the property seized. When Perkins was unable to retrieve his belongings, he filed suit on due process grounds. The issue
presented was whether the Constitution required a State or
its local entities to give detailed and specific instructions to
owners who seek return of property lawfully seized but no
longer needed for a police investigation or criminal prosecution. The Court ruled in favor of the city: "When the police
seize property for a criminal investigation, ... due process
does not require them to provide the owner with notice of
state law remedies." In the Court's view,
[a] primary purpose of the notice required by the Due
Process Clause is to ensure that the opportunity for a
hearing is meaningful. It follows that when law enforcement agents seize property pursuant to warrant,
due process requires them to take reasonable steps
to give notice that the property has been taken so the
owner can pursue available remedies for its return.
Individualized notice that the officers have taken the
property is necessary in a case such as the one before
us because the property owner would have no other
reasonable means of ascertaining who was responsible for his loss. No similar rationale justifies requiring
individualized notice of state-law remedies which, like
those at issue here, are established by published, generally available state statutes and case law. Once the
property owner is informed that his property has been
seized, he can turn to these public sources to learn
about the remedial procedures available to him.
The Court cited Federal Criminal Rule 41 (d) as an example. All that is required is "a copy of the warrant and a receipt for the property taken .... The Rule makes no provision for notifying property owners of the procedures for
seeking return of their property."

Media Presence at Search
In Wilson v. Layne, 119 S.Ct. 1692 (1 999), law enforcement officers entered petitioners' home at around 6:45 a.m.
in an attempt to execute a warrant to arrest their son.
Although the warrant did not mention a media ride-along,
the officers invited a reporter and a photographer to enter
the home. The media members were not helping the officers execute the arrest. The suspect was not home, and
the search was never reported by the media. Petitioners
subsequently brought a civil rights action.
The issue raised was whether the officers' actions in
bringing members of the media to observe and record the
execution of the arrest warrant violated petitioners' Fourth
Amendment rights. The Court ruled that a media ride-along
violates the Fourth Amendment. However, since the state
of the law was not clearly established at the time of this
search, the officers were entitled to the defense of qualified
immunity.
In the Court's view, "Physical entry of the home is the
chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth
Amendment is directed." The Court elaborated:
Here, of course, the officers had such a warrant, and
they were undoubtedly entitled to enter the Wilson
home in order to execute the arrest warrant for
Dominic Wilson. But it does not necessarily follow that
they were entitled to bring a newspaper reporter and a
photographer with them. In Horton v. California, [496
U.S. 128, 140 (1990)], we held "if the scope of the
search exceeds that permitted by the terms of a validly issued warrant or the character of the relevant exception from the warrant requirement, the subsequent
seizure is unconstitutional without more." While this
does not mean that every police action while inside a
home must be explicitly authorized by the text of the
warrant, see Michigan v. Summers, [452 U.S. 692, 705
(1981 )] (Fourth Amendment allows temporary detainer
of homeowner while police search the home pursuant
to warrant), the Fourth Amendment does require that
police actions in execution of a warrant be related to
the objectives of the authorized intrusion, see Arizona
v. Hicks, [480 U.S. 321, 325 (1 987)]. See also Maryland v. Garrison, [480 U.S. 79, 87 (1 987)] ("The purposes justifying a police search strictly limit the permissible extent of the search"). Certainly the presence of reporters inside the home was not related to
the objectives of the authorized intrusion. Respondents concede that the reporters did not engage in the
execution of the warrant, and did not assist the police
in their task. The reporters therefore were not present
for any reason related to the justification for police
entry into the home - the apprehension of Dominic
Wilson.
Similarly, in Hanlon v. Berger, 119 S.Ct. 1706 (1 999), in

FIFTH AMENDMENT
In Mitchell v. U.S., 119 S.Ct. 1307 (1 999), the defendant
pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute cocaine and of distributing cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school or playground.
' At the sentencing hearing, Mitchell claimed her Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and therefore remained silent. The case raised two issues: (1)
whether a guilty plea waives the privilege in the sentencing
phase of the case, and (2) whether, in determining facts
about the crime which bear upon the severity of the sentence, a trial court may draw an adverse inference from the
defendant's silence.
The Supreme Court ruled for the defendant on both
issues, holding that a guilty plea does not waive the privilege at sentencing, and a sentencing court may not draw an
adverse inference from defendant's failure to testify. Tlie
Court first discussed the "waiver'' rule as it applies at trial:
It is well established that a witness, in a single proceeding, may not testify voluntarily about a subject and
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380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965). The Court explained:
The rule against adverse inferences is a vital instrument for teaching that the question in a criminal case
is not whether the defendant committed the acts of
which he is accused. The question is whether the
Government has carried its burden to prove its allegations while respecting the defendant's individual rights.
The Government retains the burde.n of proving facts
relevant to the crime at the sentencing phase and cannot enlist the defendant in this process at the expense
of the self-incrimination privilege. Whether silence
bears upon the determination of a lack of remorse, or
upon acceptance of responsibility for purposes of the
downward adjustment provided in § 3E1.1 of the
United States Sentencing Guidelines {1998), is a separate question. It is not before us, and we express no
view on it.
Justice Scalia, with whom the Chief Justice, Justice
O'Connor, and Justice Thomas joined, dissented: A defendant can use her Fifth Amendment privilege to abstain from
testifying; however, this does not mean that the defendant is
protected from the sentencer drawing inferences from her
silence. The prohibition on the use of defendant's silence
as demeanor evidence is not found in the text or history of
the Fifth Amendment. "Conduct which forms a basis for inference is evidence. Silence is often the evidence of the
most persuasive character."

then invoke the privilege against self-incrimination
w~en questioned about the details. See Rogers v.
United States, [340 U.S. 367, 373 (1951 )]. The privilege is waived for the matters to which the witness testifies, and the scope of the "waiver is determined by
the scope of relevant cross examination," Brown v.
United States, [ 356 U.S. 148, 154-15 (1958)]. "The
witness himself, certainly if he is a party, determines
the area of disclosure and therefore of inquiry," id. at
155. Nice questions will arise, of course, about the extent of the initial testimony and whether the ensuing
questions are comprehended within its scope, but for
now it suffices to note the general rule.
The justifications for the rule of waiver in the testimonial context are evident: A witness may not pick
and choose what aspects of a particular subject to discuss without casting doubt on the trustworthiness of
the statements and diminishing the integrity of the factual inquiry.
The Court then distinguished guilty pleas. "There is no convincing reason why the narrow inquiry at the plea colloquy
should entail such an extensive waiver of the privilege.
Unlike the defendant taking the stand, who cannot reasonably claim that the Fifth Amendment gives him ... an immunity from cross-examination on the matters he has himself
put in dispute, ... the defendant who pleads guilty puts
nothing in dispute regarding the essentials of the offense.
Rather, the defendant takes those matters out of dispute,
often by making a joint statement with the prosecution or
confirming the prosecution's version of the facts. Under
these circumstances, there is little danger that the court will
be misled by selective disclosure. In this respect a guilty
plea is more like an offer to stipulate than a decision to take
the stand." In a later passage, the Court noted: "A waiver
of a right to trial with its attendant privileges is not a waiver
of the privileges which exist beyond the confines of the
trial."
Moreover, the Court observed that a guilty plea does not
automatically extinguish any further risk of criminal prosecution. 'Where a sentence has yet to be imposed, ... however, this Court has already rejected the proposition that 'incrimination is complete once guilt has been adjudicated,'
Estelle v. Smith, [451 U.S. 454, 462 (1981 )], and we reject it
again today." In addition, "[w]here the sentence has not yet
been imposed a defendant may have a legitimate fear of
adverse consequences from further testimony."
The Court further remarked:
[l]t appears that in this case, as is often true in the
criminal justice system, the defendant was less concerned with the proof of her guilt or innocence than
with the severity of her punishment. Petitioner faced
imprisonment from one year upwards to life, depending on the circumstances of the crime. To say that she
had no right to remain silent but instead could be compelled to cooperate in the deprivation of her liberty
would ignore the Fifth Amendment privilege at the precise stage where, from her point of view, it was most
important. Our rule is applicable whether or not the
sentencing hearing is deemed a proceeding separate
from the Rule 11 hearing, an issue we need not resolve.
Finally, the Court examined the "negative inference" rule.
The normal rule is that no negative inference from the defendant's failure to testify is permitted. Griffin v. California,

RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION
In Lilly v. Virginia, 119 S.Ct. 1887 {1999), the defendant
was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death.
Three men broke into a home and stole nine bottles of
liquor, three loaded guns, and a safe. They also robbed a
small country store, abducting and then killing DeFilippis.
After robbing two more stores, they were found by the police and questioned. Lilly did not mention the murder to the
police, but the other two men said that Lilly was the group
leader and that he had killed DeFilippis. At trial, Lilly's
brother, one of the accomplices, invoked his Fifth
Amendment right, but a tape recording and written transcripts of his statements to the police were admitted into evidence.
On review, the Supreme Court was required to decide
whether the accused's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation had been violated. The Court reversed. In addressing
the issue, the Court adhered to the general framework summarized in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 {1980): A hearsay
statement is admissible only when (1) the statement falls
within a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception or (2) it contains
"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."
The Court then observed: "The decisive fact, which we
make explicit today, is that accomplices' confessions that inculpate a criminal defendant are not within a firmly rooted
exception to the hearsay rule as that concept has been defined in our Confrontation Clause jurisprudence."
Moreover, there was no particularized guarantee of trustworthiness: "It is abundantly clear that neither the words
that Mark spoke nor the setting in which he was questioned
provides any basis for concluding that his comments regarding petitioner's guilt were so reliable that there was no
need to subject them to adversarial testing in a trial setting.
Mark was in custody for his involvement in, and knowledge
of, serious crimes and made his statements under the supervision of governmental authorities. He was primarily re4

spending to the officers' leading questions, which were
asked, without any contemporaneous cross-examination by
adverse parties. Thus, Mark had a natural motive to attempt
t9 exculpate himself as much as possible."
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The Court began its analysis by underscoring the importance of advising the defendant of the right to appeal: "The
requirement that the district court inform a defendant of his
right to appeal serves important functions." First, as soon
as sentence is imposed, the defendant will often be taken
into custody and transported elsewhere, making it difficult
for him to maintain contact with his attorney. The relationship between the defendant and the attorney may also be
strained after sentencing, due to a defendant's disappointment over the outcome. Moreover, the attorney concentrating on other matters may fail to inform the defendant of the
right to appeal. Second, if the defendant is advised of the
right by the judge who imposes sentence, the defendant will
realize that the appeal may be taken as of right and without
affront to the trial judge, who may later rule upon a motion
to modify or reduce the sentence. Third, advising the defendant of his right at sentencing also provides him with an
opportunity to announce his intention to appeal and request
the court clerk to file the notice of appeal, well before the
10-day filing period runs. See Fed. Grim. R.32(c)(5) ("If the
defendant so requests, the clerk of the court must immediately prepare and file a notice of appeal on behalf of the defendant."); Fed. App. R. 4(b) (establishing 10-day period for
filing appeal, which may be extended for 30 days by district
court for "excusable neglect'').
The Court concluded: "These considerations underscore
the importance of the advice which comes from the court itself. Trial judges must be meticulous and precise in following each of the requirements of Rule 32 in every case. It is
undisputed, then, that the court's failure to give the required
advice was error." However, a violation of Rule 32(a)(2) is
subject to harmless error review. The Court ruled that because the "petitioner was aware of his right to appeal, the
purpose of the Rule had been served and petitioner was not
entitled to relief."

VOID-FOR-VAGUENESS DOCTRINE
In Chicago v. Morales, 119 S.Ct. 1849 (1999), the defendants moved to dismiss charges based on the city's gang
loitering ordinance, which prohibited "criminal street gang
members" from "loitering" with one another or with other
persons in any public place. During the three years of its
enforcement, the police issued over 89,000 dispersal orders
and arrested over 42,000 people for violating the ordinance.
The Court found the ordinance unconstitutional.
In the Court's view, "[v]agueness may invalidate a criminal law for either of two independent reasons. First, it may
fail to provide the kind of notice that will enable ordinary
people to understand what conduct it prohibits; second, it
may authorize and even encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." See also Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382
U.S. 399, 402-03 (1966)("1t is established that a law fails to
meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause if it is so
vague and standardless that it leaves the public uncertain
as to the conduct it prohibits ...."); Lanzetta v. New Jersey,
306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939)("No one may be required at peril
of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of
penal statutes."). In the majority's view, the ordinance failed
on both counts.
·
Justice Breyer, concurring, wrote that the ordinance had
the potential of penalizing many innocent people. "To grant
to a policeman virtually standardless discretion to close off
major portions of the city to an innocent person is, in my
view, to create a major, not a 'minor,' 'limitation upon the
free state of nature."
The dissent noted that the ordinance did not outlaw loitering; it only authorized the police to order people to disperse. When this dispersal order was not obeyed, and only
then was the conduct unlawful. Further, the majority was incorrect in their belief that the ordinance punished the mindless act of loitering. The ordinance actually only punished
the willful act of ignoring a police order to disperse, as such
there is a mens rea requirement. Because there is no constitutional right to stay in one place, "it is up to the citizens of
Chicago- not us- to decide whether the trade-off," the
possibility of some inconvenience for innocent people versus safer streets for all, was worthwhile. "So long as constitutionally guaranteed rights are not affected, and so long as
the proscription has a rational basis, all sorts of perfectly
harmless activity by millions of perfectly innocent people
can be forbidden."

DUTY TO DISCLOSE EVIDENCE
In Strickler v. Greene, 119 S.Ct. 1936 (1999), the victim
was abducted from a shopping center, robbed, and murdered. At trial an eyewitness, Stoltzfus, gave detailed testimony about the crimes and the defendant's role as one of
the perpetrators. Information about the witness's earlier
statements was not disclosed to the defense, thereby raising a Brady issue. The question before the Court was
whether the defendant would have been convicted of capital
murder and received the death sentence if Stoltzfus had not
testified, or if Stoltzfus had been impeached. Court ruled
against the accused.
The Court pointed out that there "are three components
of a true Brady violation: The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or
because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been
suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and
prejudice must have ensued." In this case, the Court found
that the suppressed evidence was exculpatory. The materials consisted of notes taken by a detective during interviews
with an eyewitness and letters written by the witness to the
detective. "They cast serious doubt on [the witness's] confident assertion of her 'exceptionally good memory."' The
Court held, however, that the accused had not established
prejudice.
The dissent viewed the facts differently: "The withheld
documents would have shown, ... that many of the details
Stoltzfus confidently mentioned on the stand (such as
Strickler's appearance, [the victim's] appearance, the hour

GUILTY PLEAS
In Peguero v. United States, 119 S.Ct. 961 (1999), the
defendant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 27 4 months
imprisonment for cocaine distribution. The trial court, however, failed to inform him of his right to appeal the sentence. Nevertheless, Peguero was in fact aware of this
right. The issue was whether the trial court's failure to advise the defendant of the right to appeal his sentence entitled him to collateral relief. The Supreme Court ruled
against the defendant: "[A] district court's failure to advise
the defendant of his right to appeal does not entitle him to
habeas relief if he knew of his right and hence suffered no
prejudice from the omission."

5

Congress' careful concentration on the ongoing enterprise
and replaces it with a concentration on perhaps three violations picked out of the continuing series." The intent of the
statute is specifically to punish drug kingpins, such as the
defendant.

of the day when the episode occurred, and her daughter's
all~ged notation of the license plate number of [the victim's]
car) had apparently escaped her memory in the initial int~r
view with the police.~· Because confident eyewitness testimony is often a very significant factor in jurors' deliberations, "[o]ne cannot be reasonably confident that not a
single juror would have had a different perspective after an
impeachment that would have destroyed the credibility of
that story."
Nevertheless, the majority did include a significant comment concerning the relationship between Brady and a
prosecutor's "open file policy": 'We certainly do not criticize
the prosecution's use of the open file policy. We recognize
that this practice may increase the efficiency and the fairness of the criminal process. We merely note that, if a prosecutor asserts that he complies with Brady through an open
file policy, defense counsel may reasonably rely on that file
to contain all materials the State is constitutionally obligated
to disclose under Brady."

FAILURE TO INSTRUCT: HARMLESS ERROR
In Neder v. United States, 119 S.Ct. 1827 (1999), the defendant was convicted of various false statements, fraud,
conspiracy, and racketeering offenses. The Supreme Court
affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The contested issue was whether the trial judge's omission of an element of the charge in the jury instructions can be harmles!:
error. The Court ruled in the affirmative.
In prior cases, the Court had held that most constitutiona
errors can be harmless: "If the defendant had counsel and
was tried by an impartial adjudicator, there is a strong presumption that any other constitutional errors that may have
occurred are subject to harmless-error analysis." Rose v.
Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579 (1986). The Court, however, has
found that some errors are "structural" and thus subject to
automatic reversal. This limited category includes the following errors: (1) Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461,
468 (1997) (complete denial of counsel); (2) Tumey v. Ohio,
273 U.S. 510 (1927) (biased trial judge); (3) Vasquez v.
Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986) (racial discrimination in selection of grand jury); (4) McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168
(1984) (denial of self-representation at trial); (5) Waller v.
Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984) (denial of public trial); (6)
Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1 993) (defective reasonable-doubt instruction)).
The error in Neder- a jury instruction that omits an element of the offense - differed from these constitutional violations. Those cases involve errors that "infect the entire
trial process." Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 630
(1993). They "necessarily render a trial fundamentally unfair." Rose, 478 U.S. at 577. In other words, these errors
deprive defendants of "basic protections" without which "a
criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle
for determination of guilt or innocence ... and no criminal
punishment may be regarded as fundamentally fair." ld. at
577-78.
In contrast, an instruction that omits an element of the offense does not necessarily render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair or an unreliable vehicle for determining guilt or
innocence. r.[T]he omitted element was uncontested and
supported by overwhelming evidence, such that the jury
verdict would have been the same absent the error, the erroneous instruction is properly found to be harmless."
The dissent wrote: "[D]epriving a criminal defendant of
the right to have the jury determine his guilt of the crime
charged-which necessarily means his commission of
every element of the crime charged-can never be harmless." The question that the majority's opinion raises is
"why, if denying the right to conviction by jury is structural
error, taking one of the elements of the crime away from the
jury should be treated differently from taking all of them
away-since failure to prove one, no less than failure to
prove all, utterly prevents conviction." According to the dissent, ''The right to render the verdict in criminal prosecutions
belongs exclusively to the jury; reviewing it belongs to the
appellate court."

JURY TRIALS
In Richardson v. United States, 119 S.Ct. 1707 (1999);
the accused was charged with engaging in a "continuing
criminal enterprise." A jury convicted him, under the statute,
for leading a gang that distributed heroin, crack cocaine,
and powder cocaine over a period of years stretching from
1984 to 1991. At trial, the judge "instructed the jurors that
they must unanimously agree that the defendant committed
at least three federal narcotics offenses, but did not have to
agree as to the particular offenses."
The issue before the Court was whether the statute's
phrase "series of violations" referred to one element, or
whether those words created several elements. The issue
was important because "[c]alling a particular kind of fact an
'element' carries certain legal consequences. . . . The consequence that matters for this case is that a jury in a federal
criminal case cannot convict unless it unanimously finds
that the Government has proved each element." (Citing
Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 369-371 (1972)
(Powell, J., concurring); Andres v. United States, 333 U.S.
740,748 (1948); Fed. Grim. R. 31).
The Court used the following example to illustrate the
issue: "Where, for example, an element of robbery is force
or the threat of force, some jurors might conclude that the
defendant used a knife to create the threat; others might
conclude he used a gun. But that disagreement- a disagreement about means·- would not matter as long as all
12 jurors unanimously concluded that the Government had
proved the necessary related element, namely that the defendant had threatened force." This case, however, was different because the Government's interpretation would impose "punishment on a defendant for the underlying crimes
without any factfinder having found that the defendant committed those crimes. If there are federal statutes reflecting a
different practice or tradition, the Government has not called
them to our attention, which suggests that any such statute
would represent a lesser known exception to ordinary practice." The Court ruled that the jury must unanimously agree
not only that the defendant committed some "continuing series of violations" but also that he committed each of the individual "violations" necessary to make up that "continuing
series."
The dissent argued that the majority's "unnecessary atomization of the continuing series element disrupts
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DEATH PENALTY
In Jones v. United States, 119 S.Ct. 2090 (1999), the defendant was convicted of kidnapping with death resulting
and was sentenced to death. The defendant kidnaped
Private McBride at gunpoint and sexually assaulted her. He
(J;
beat her with a tire iron in the head. When her body was
'later found, "the medical examiners observed that large
pieces of her skull had been driven into her cranial cavity or
were missing." At the sentencing hearing the jury recommended unanimously that the defendant be sentenced to
death. The district court agreed and sentenced him to
death.
The case raised the issue of whether the defendant was
entitled to an instruction as to the consequences of jury
deadlock. The Court ruled that ''the Eighth Amendment
does not require that the jury be instructed as to the consequences of their failure to agree." Previously, the Court had
ruled that a jury cannot be "affirmatively misled regarding its
role in the sentencing process." Romano v. Oklahoma, 512
U.S. 1, 9 (1994). However, the jury in this case had not
been affirmatively misled by the trial court's refusal to give
the accused's proposed instruction. The proposed instruction had no bearing on the jury's role in the sentencing
process; it focused on what happens in the event that the
jury is unable to fulfill its role - when deliberations break
down and the jury is unable to produce a unanimous sentence recommendation.
The district court never told the jury that it would give the
defendant a lighter sentence in the event that the jury could
not agree. In fact, the court said that it would impose a sentence "authorized by the law," which meant life without leave
or death. Further, even though the verdict forms may have
been confusing when looked at independently, in light of the
entire jury instruction, there should not have been any confusion. "Moreover, even assuming that the jurors were confused over the consequences of deadlock, petitioner cannot
show the confusion necessarily worked to his detriment. ...
Where the effect of an alleged error is so uncertain, a defendant cannot meet his burden of showing that the error
actually affected his substantial rights."
The Court also addressed a void-for-vagueness argument. "Ensuring that a sentence of death is not so infected
with bias or caprice is our 'controlling objective when we examine eligibility and selection factors for vagueness."'
Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 973 (1994). This review, however, is "quite deferential." As long as an aggravating factor has a core meaning that criminal juries should
be able to understand, it passes constitutional muster.
"Assessed under this deferential standard, the factors challenged here surely are not vague."
In the dissent's view, "accurate sentencing information is
an indispensable prerequisite to a [jury's] determination of
whether a defendant shall live or die." The sentencing information in this case seemed to include a nonexistent option,
namely, that the trial court could impose some type of lesser
sentence. Therefore, the case should be remanded for a
new sentencing hearing.

New York to Maryland. While in Maryland, the defendant
came into possession of a gun and held it to the kidnaped
victim's head. He did not shoot, and the victim later escaped. The Court granted certiorari to determine whether
venue in a prosecution for using or carrying a firearm during
and in relation to any crime of violence, 18 U.S. C. §
924(c)(1 ), is proper in any district where the crime of violence was committed, even if the firearm was used or carried only in a single district.
Article Ill of the Constitution requires that ''the Trial of all
Crimes ... shall be held in the State where the said Crimes
shall have been committed." Art. Ill,§ 2, cl. 3. In addition,
the Sixth Amendment requires that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed." Finally, Federal
Criminal Rule 18 provides that "prosecution shall be had in
a district in which the offense was committed."
The Supreme Court had previously ruled that the "locus
delicti [of the charged offense] must be determined from the
nature of the crime alleged and the location of the act or
acts constituting it." United States v. Cabrales, 524 U.S. 1,
6-7 (1998) (quoting United States v. Anderson, 328 U.S.
699, 703 (1946)). In applying this test, a court must identify
the conduct constituting the offense (the nature of the
crime) and then discern the location of the commission of
the criminal acts. See Cabrales, 524 U.S. at 6-7; Travis v.
United States, 364 U.S. 631, 635-637 (1961 ); United States
v. Cores, 356 U.S. 405, 408-409 (1958).
The Court rejected the argument that the crime was a
"point-in-time" offense that is committed only in the place
where the kidnaping and the use of a gun coincide. Rejecting this view, several circuits had determined that kidnaping
is a "unitary" crime. The Supreme Court agreed: "A kidnaping, once begun, does not end until the victim is free. It
does not make sense, then, to speak of it in discrete geographic fragments." See also United States v. Lombardo,
241 U.S. 73 (1916) ("where a crime consists of distinct parts
which have different localities the whole may be tried where
any part can be proved to have been done."); Hyde v.
United States, 225 U.S. 347, 356-367 (1912) (venue proper
against defendant in district where co-conspirator carried
out overt acts even though there was no evidence that the
defendant had ever entered that district or that the conspiracy was formed there).
The Court held that Congress had provided that continuing offenses can be tried "in any district on which such offense was begun, continued, or completed," 18 U.S.C. §
3237(a). Ev~n though respondent only used the gun in
rylaryland, he did it "during and in relation to" the continuous
crime of kidnaping, which occurred in Texas, New York,
New Jersey, and Maryland.
CARJACKING
In Holloway v. United States, 119 S.Ct. 966 (1999), the
petitioner was found guilty on three counts of carjacking,
and several related offenses. In each of the carjacking incidents, petitioner's accomplice approached the driver with a
gun. The accomplice would threaten the driver that he
would shoot if the keys were not handed over. The accomplice testified that he hoped to never use the gun, but would
if he had to. The only actual violence was one punch,
caused by a victim's hesitation in giving-up his car. The
issue was whether the phrase "with the intent to cause

VENUE
In United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 119 S.Ct. 1239
(1999), a drug distributor hired a small group including the
defendant to find a specific drug dealer and to hold the middleman captive. The group kidnaped the middleman and
forced him to travel with them from Texas to New Jersey to
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The police followed and the chase ended when Jones
crashed. Jones was told that he faced a maximum of 15years, defined by the carjacking statute. However, after
being found guilty by the jury, the court imposed a 25-year
sentence on the carjacking charge because one victim suffered serious bodily injury. Jones argued that the 25-year
sentence for serious bodily injury was invalid because serious bodily injury is a separate element, ''which had been
neither pleaded in the indictment nor proven before the
jury."
The issue on appeal was whether the federal carjacking
statute, defined three distinct offenses or a single crime with
a choice of three maximum penalties, two of them dependent on sentencing factors exempt from the requirements of
charge and jury verdict. The Supreme Court held that the
provision that established higher penalties for serious bodily
injury or death set forth additional elements of the offense,
not mere sentencing considerations. The Court reasoned:
"[W]here a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by
one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions
arise and by the other of which such questions are avoided," the Court will choose to avoid the constitutional questions. The Court looked to the textual structure of the
statute and other similar statutes, "on the fair assumption
that Congress is unlikely to intend any radical departures
from past practice without making a point of saying so."
From this the majority concluded that§ 2911 (2) and§
2911 (3) were distinct offenses. Further, the Court should
not diminish "the jury's significance by removing control
over" factual determinations.

death or serious bodily harm" required the prosecution to
prove that the defendant had an unconditional intent to kill
or harm in all events, or whether it merely required proof of
an intent to kill or harm, if necessary, to effect a carjacking.
When the actual text does not specify, the meaning of a
statute depends on the context. The intent may be "conditional" or "unconditional." The purpose of the statute was
to penalize those who steal cars. It did not seem reasonable to think Congress amended the statute so that it "would
no longer prohibit the very crime it was enacted to address
except in those unusual circumstances when carjackers
also intended to commit another crime - murder or a serious assault."
Justice Scalia dissented. According to traditional
English, "intent" usually meant something one wants and
expects to happen; not something one does not want or expect to happen. Further, there is no basis for finding that
there is a different meaning of "intent" in criminal law.
"Conditional intent is no more embraced by the unmodified
word 'intent' than a sea lion is embraced by the unmodified
word 'lion."' Justice Thomas also dissented: Without a
stronger precedent for criminal statutes including "conditional intent" as a recognized part of the unmodified term "intent," it should not be presumed that Congress meant to include both "conditional and unconditional intent" in the
statute's meaning of intent.
In Jones v. United States, 119 S.Ct. 1215 (1999), Jones
and two other men robbed two victims. One of Jones's accomplices struck one victim on the head and in his ear,
causing serious bodily damage. Jones forced the other victim out the victim's car and drove away in the stolen vehicle.
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